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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
NORMAN ANDREW HAGA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960405-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment 
of conviction entered May 20, 1996. This Court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (Supp. 1996) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (9) (a) (Supp. 1996) 
Rule 4 04, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
The text of the above statutes, rules and constitutional 
provisions is contained in Addendum A. 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Did the prosecutor commit reversible misconduct 
when he made unsupported claims that Appellant's key alibi 
witness had received stolen property from Appellant, using the 
witness's prior conviction of Theft by Receiving as character 
evidence to support the claim? 
Standard of Review: This Court will reverse a jury 
verdict on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct if the defendant 
demonstrates that 
[t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call 
to the attention of the jury a matter it would 
not be justified in considering in determining 
its verdict and, if so, under the circumstances 
of the particular case, whether the error is 
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there 
would have been a more favorable result. 
[citations omitted]. 
State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 608, 609, 
610. 
Issue II: Did the prosecutor commit reversible 
misconduct when he implied that because Appellant's alibi 
witnesses had not come forward to law enforcement prior to the 
time required by statute, their testimony was not credible? 
Standard of Review: See Issue I. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 448, 606-
607. 
Issue III: Did defense counsel render ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to object when the prosecutor 
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argued that the victim had a bad "feeling" about Appellant 
because he sensed that Appellant had criminal inclinations? 
Standard of Review: In order to establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his 
lawyer's performance was deficient in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) "there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different" had counsel not performed deficiently. State v. 
Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah 1996). 
Issue IV: Did defense counsel render ineffective 
assistance of counsel by failing to object to the prosecutor's 
expression of his personal opinion of the weight of the photo 
spread identification evidence? 
Standard of Review: See Issue III. 
Issue V: Did the trial court have statutory authority to 
order restitution to the victim's insurance company? 
Standard of Review: The question of whether a sentence 
has been imposed illegally is a question of law reviewed without 
deference to the trial court. Rule 22(2), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure; State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995). 
Preservation of Issue: An illegal sentence can be 
challenged for the first time on appeal. Brooks, 908 P.2d at 
860. 
Issue VI: Did defense counsel render ineffective 
assistance of counsel by failing to seek a remedy to the State's 
failure to comply with the rules of discovery? 
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Standard of Review: See Issue III. 
Issue VII: Did defense counsel render ineffective 
assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and present 
evidence that prior to trial, the State had sent the only 
eyewitness to the crime a photograph of Appellant? 
Standard of Review: See Issue III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On November 21, 1994, Appellant was found guilty by a 
jury of Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1994), and Burglary, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1994), the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya presiding. Appellant was not sentenced until 
May 20, 1996, and Judgment was entered on that date. R. 191-92. 
On June 12, 1996, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 12, 1994, Dee Leasing, a wholesale computer 
store located at 177 West 2100 South, was burglarized. R. 528. 
On this date at approximately 9:30 a.m., Richard Engh ("Engh") 
delivered a van to Dee Leasing. R. 321, 329. Engh noticed the 
front door was open. There was no one inside the business. The 
door looked like it had been forced. R. 325. The telephone was 
dead. Engh notified the police. R. 326. He did not see anyone 
or any suspicious vehicles. R. 329. 
Detective Dustin Hansen ("Hansen") with the South Salt 
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Lake Police Department responded to Engh's call. R. 330-31. The 
front door to Dee Leasing was open and the lock was lying on the 
floor. R. 332. Several doors had been pried open. R. 333. 
The building appeared to have been entered through the east door 
which had been pried open. R. 335. Upon discovering that the 
telephone was dead, Hansen climbed onto the roof to inspect the 
lines. R. 336-37. Dee Leasing is surrounded by a high fence. 
The secretary had unlocked the gate after the crime. R. 341. 
Hansen climbed a metal tire rack next to the east fence of the 
building onto the roof of an adjacent building, and climbed down 
from that roof onto the roof of Dee Leasing. R. 337-38. The 
lines had been cut close to the road, at the top of the roof. 
R. 338, 340. 
Larry Olson ("Olson"), owner of the On & Off Roadhouse 
located next door to Dee Leasing, told Hansen that at 
approximately 9:20 that morning, he saw somebody loading boxes 
out of Dee Leasing into a white pickup. He described a white 
male, 36 to 38 years old, bald, with light brown hair, five-six 
to five-eight, about 150 pounds with a thin build. R. 342-43. 
Olson told Hansen the truck was an old Chevy, with blue, orange 
and black lettering on the side. Olson told Hansen that he could 
not read the lettering clearly, but it had something to do with 
insulation. R. 343. Olson told him it could have been a 
Commercial Insulation truck. R. 351-52. Hansen testified that 
there is a business called Commercial Insulators located about a 
mile and a half from Dee Leasing that uses vehicles matching that 
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description. R. 344. Hansen also found human feces on the floor 
of Dee Leasing. R. 345. Fingerprints were taken from the scene 
and turned over to the State Crime Lab. R. 346. 
Tracy Tingey ("Tingey"), a detective with the South Salt 
Lake City Police Department, showed Olson a photo spread 
containing a photo of Appellant. R. 441, 445-46. Olson 
identified Appellant. R. 446-47. Olson told Tingey during his 
initial interview that he had seen an individual loading boxes 
into the back of a pickup truck the morning of the burglary. 
R. 447. Tingey testified that the letter opener and screwdriver 
used in the burglary were tested for fingerprints. R. 451. 
There were no fingerprints on the screwdriver. The fingerprints 
on the letter opener did not match Appellant's fingerprints. 
R. 452. 
Olson testified that on the morning of the burglary at 
approximately 9:00 a.m., he saw an early model Chevy pickup truck 
parked in front of Dee Leasing. R. 462, 465-66. He saw someone 
standing toward the back of the pickup truck. As he walked 
around the front of the truck, he noticed a logo on the side of 
the truck that said "Custom Installations." R. 466. Thinking 
that the owner of Dee Leasing was having something installed, 
Olson did not notify the police. R. 466-67, 472, 483. Olson did 
try to take down the license number of the truck, but the front 
plate was missing. R. 467. Olson described the individual he 
saw as a smaller male with a receding hair line. R. 469. Olson 
testified that the man just stood there, not doing anything. 
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R. 470. Olson made eye contact with the man, went back into his 
store for about five minutes, and then came back outside. 
R. 470-71. The truck was still there, but Olson could not 
remember if the man was still there. R. 471. Olson testified 
that he did not see the man loading any items of merchandise into 
the truck. R. 4 71. The prosecutor asked Olson if he remembered 
telling Officer Tingey that he had seen the man loading boxes 
into the truck. R. 474. Olson stated he could not remember 
seeing any boxes. R. 474. 
Officer Tingey, "a long time later," showed Olson a photo 
spread. R. 474-76. Olson identified Appellant as the person he 
had seen. R. . Next to the photograph of Appellant, Olson 
wrote, "This is the person loading P.U. at Dee Leasing." R. 476. 
Despite seeing this notation, Olson could not remember seeing the 
man loading anything onto the truck. R. 477. The photo spread 
was admitted into evidence. R. 506. Olson identified Appellant 
as the person he saw by the truck on the morning of the burglary. 
R. 478. Olson also testified that often pallets were left on the 
west side of his business adjacent to Dee Leasing. R. 481-82. 
Olson first testified that could not say how long he 
observed the man near the truck as he pulled into his business. 
R. 4 91. He then stated he saw the man for at least one to two 
minutes. R. 491-92. Olson testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he observed the man for less than a minute. R. 4 91-93. 
Olson was unsure whether he could still see the man near the 
truck after he had parked his car. R. 491. 
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Olson admitted that at the preliminary hearing, he 
testified that he was not sure if he saw the man put any boxes 
into the truck. R. 4 94. Olson was not able to describe the 
clothing style or color of the man he saw. R. 498-99. 
On May 10, 1994, Clayton Dumas ("Dumas") with the West 
Valley Police Department saw a truck he believed matched the 
description of the truck Olson saw at Dee Leasing the morning of 
the burglary. R. 522-23. The truck belonged to Appellant, had 
broken down and was being repaired by him. R. 524. Appellant's 
truck was an older white Chevy, with red/orange lettering on a 
blue triangle that said "Intermountain Installers." See State's 
Exhibit 10-S. 
Donald Kaufer ("Kaufer"), the owner of Dee Leasing, 
testified that on March 12, 1994 at about 10:00 a.m., he received 
a call from Engh that his business was wide open and had been 
ransacked. R. 527, 531. Kaufer discovered that the side door 
had been opened with a pry bar, and the alarm disarmed. R. 532-
33. The dead bolt on the front door had been removed. R. 533-
334. A letter opener or screwdriver had been used to pry open 
the cash drawer. R. 534. Kaufer testified that there was a 
pallet by the fence that could have been used as a ladder to 
scale the fence enclosing the business. R. 535. Kaufer 
testified that approximately $14,251.07 in computer parts and 
equipment were missing. R. 545. Detective Hansen told Kaufer 
that he believed whoever burglarized the business had been there 
before, and gave him Olson's description. R. 554-55. Kaufer 
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told Hansen that the description matched Appellant. R. 555. 
Kaufer indicated that Appellant was a prior customer who he had 
hired once to repair a computer part. R. 547. They had no 
disagreements in connection with the repair work. R. 550. 
Richard Perry ("Perry") testified for Appellant. R. 595. 
Perry testified that Appellant was at his place of business, 
A & P Tire and Oil, 6217 West 4100 South, from 9:00 a.m. to 
9:00 p.m. on March 12, 1994. R. 596-97. Perry testified that 
Appellant was never gone for more than 15 minutes during the day. 
R. 597. Perry stated that Appellant was limping that day from an 
injury to his foot. R. 598. Perry admitted that in 1986, he had 
a prior felony conviction for theft by receiving and attempted 
homicide. R. 604. 
Steven Lynn Earl ("Earl"), an employee at A & P Tire, 
testified that Appellant was at A & P Tire all day on March 12, 
1994 working on a computer keyboard. R. 616. He, too, noticed 
that Appellant was dragging his foot. R. 616. Ruth Haga 
("Mrs. Haga"), Appellant's wife, testified that Appellant had a 
swollen foot and was unable to even walk up and down the stairs 
at his home. R. 624-25. On March 11, 1994, she had taken 
Appellant to the hospital to have his foot treated. R. 632. 
Dr. Brian Turner testified that he had treated Appellant 
on March 11, 1994 for foot pain. He observed Appellant limping, 
and noted that his foot was swollen and the joint below the big 
toe inflamed. R. 637-38. Dr. Turner gave Appellant an injection 
in his foot for pain and to decrease the swelling. R. 643. 
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Dr. Turner testified that based on his observations, Appellant 
would have had difficulty engaging in any kind of physical 
activity. R. 639. Dr. Turner did, however, admit on cross-
examination that it would not have been impossible for Appellant 
to climb a ladder if he had really wanted to do so. R. 647. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor committed numerous acts of reversible 
misconduct. The prosecutor, during cross-examination of 
Appellant's key alibi witness, made unsupported inferences that 
the witness had purchased stolen property from Appellant. He 
then argued at closing without any factual support in the record 
that the witness dealt in stolen property, and therefore should 
not be believed. The prosecutor then used the witness's prior 
conviction eight years ago for Theft by Receiving as character 
evidence to support his argument. This line of questioning and 
argument violated the longstanding rule that the prosecutor 
cannot imply the existence of a prejudicial fact unless he has 
some proof of its truth. Likewise, the prosecutor is not 
permitted to use a prior conviction as evidence of a witness's 
bad character. 
The prosecutor also unfairly undermined Appellant's alibi 
defense by implying that because the witnesses had not come 
forward to law enforcement prior to the statutory period, the 
alibi was fabricated. This inference improperly encouraged the 
jury to speculate that there was something suspicious about the 
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timing of the notice of alibi when, in fact, the defense had 
complied with the law. 
Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to object to other acts of prosecutorial 
misconduct. Counsel failed to object when the prosecutor 
elicited testimony from the victim that when he first met 
Appellant, he had an "uncomfortable feeling" about him. The 
prosecutor then invited the jury to rely on the victim's 
"feeling" as proof of Appellant's guilt, implying that he had 
somehow sensed that Appellant was a bad person from the beginning 
and had been right. Defense counsel also failed to object when 
the prosecutor commented on the weight of the photo spread 
identification evidence and referred to Appellant's defense as a 
"ploy" meant to embarrass and harass the victim. 
Defense counsel also rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel by failing to seek a remedy when the State failed to 
comply with the rules of discovery by providing counsel with 
invoices and receipts documenting the existence of the claimed 
stolen property. Lastly, counsel failed to investigate and 
present evidence that the eyewitness to the crime had been given 
a photograph of Appellant after the photo spread identification, 
but prior to the preliminary hearing and trial. 
The trial court was without statutory authority to impose 
restitution to the victim's insurance company for losses it 
covered pursuant to the policy. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(9) (a) 
(Supp. 1996) defines a victim as the person against whom the 
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crime has been directly committed. In this case, the direct 
victim of the crime was Dee Leasing. The insurance company is 
not a victim and is therefore not entitled to restitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
MISCONDUCT. 
Prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal occurs where 
(1) "the [prosecutor's] remarks 'called to the jurors' attention 
matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
reaching a verdict" and (2) such remarks were harmful. State v. 
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) (quotations omitted); see also 
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 485-6 (Utah 1984). 
A. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY MAKING 
PREJUDICIAL, UNSUPPORTED INFERENCES DURING CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF APPELLANT'S ALIBI WITNESS AND 
USING HIS PRIOR CONVICTION AS CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM. 
Generally, it is error for the prosecutor to ask a 
defense witness a question that "implies the existence of a 
prejudicial fact unless the prosecution can prove the existence 
of the fact. Otherwise, the only limit on such a line of 
questioning would be the prosecutor's imagination." Emmett, 839 
P.2d at 786-87; State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). In Palmer, the prosecutor, during cross-examination of 
the defendant in a child sex case, implied that the defendant had 
told the child's stepfather he had inappropriate feelings towards 
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the victim. 860 P.2d at 342. Because the prosecutor never put 
on any evidence to support the allegation, the court concluded 
that the prosecutor committed misconduct. .Id. at 342-43. The 
court found the prosecutor's misconduct so "egregious" that it 
reviewed the issue despite the fact that no objection had been 
made at trial. Id. at 343. See also Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786-87 
(prosecutor's unsupported question to defendant if he had 
rehearsed his testimony with his attorney error). 
In this case, during cross-examination of Appellant's key 
alibi witness, Perry, the prosecutor implied without any 
supporting evidence that Perry had purchased stolen computer 
parts from Appellant. 
Prosecutor: The computer that you actually got, 
where did you get the computer? 
Witness: I got it from a man by the name of 
Paul. 
Prosecutor: Do you know his last name? 
Witness: Adams 
Prosecutor: He is in the business of selling 
computers? 
Witness: No. 
R. 607-08. At this point, defense counsel objected to the 
inference that Perry's computer equipment was stolen. R. 608. 
The court allowed the prosecutor to continue the line of 
questioning. 
Prosecutor: Did you purchase the program from 
Mr. Haga? 
Witness: No. 
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Prosecutor: What software was Mr. Haga using to 
program your computer? 
Witness: Just some computer disks like DOS. 
R. 608. Defense counsel then objected to relevancy of the 
questions. In response, the prosecutor admitted that he was 
trying to infer that Appellant was selling stolen computer parts 
and software to his friends, including Perry. 
Prosecutor: Let me explain. It goes to motive. 
If this person is stealing computer components 
and software and then turning around and 
retailing them or wholesaling them or backdooring 
them to friends or associates or other people, 
that is a motive for theft. I'm trying to 
explore that with this individual. 
R. 609. Over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor again 
implied that Perry had purchased stolen computer parts from 
Appellant. 
Prosecutor: Did you buy any computer equipment 
from Mr. Haga? 
Witness: No. 
Prosecutor: Did you at any time buy any computer 
equipment from Mr. Haga? 
Witness: No. 
Prosecutor: Any disks? 
Witness: No. 
Prosecutor: Any other components that would be 
associated with a computer? 
Witness: I have a keyboard that belongs to 
Norman, and he has my other one that he is 
supposed to be repairing it. 
Prosecutor: When did you get a keyboard from 
Mr. Haga? 
Witness: Two months ago. 
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Prosecutor: Did you ever check to see if it had 
a serial number? 
Witness: Yes, it does. 
Prosecutor: Did you attempt to ascertain whether 
or not it had been stolen? 
Witness: I didn't ask him that, no. 
R. 609-610. Again defense counsel objected and challenged the 
prosecutor to produce evidence to support his line of 
questioning. R. 610. The prosecutor was allowed to continue. 
Prosecutor: Did you get any kind of an invoice 
or bill or anything to suggest that Mr. Haga had 
procured it through a retailer or wholesaler 
prior to him giving it to you? 
Witness: No. He let me borrow it. He did not 
give it to me or sell it to me. 
Prosecutor: Are you still using it? 
Witness: Yes, I am. 
Prosecutor: Is that at your place of business? 
Witness: Yes, it is. 
R. 610-11. The prosecutor never produced a shred of evidence to 
support the implied allegation that Perry had purchased stolen 
computer equipment from Appellant. Though the prosecutor told 
the trial court his questions were intended to explore 
Appellant's motive, it is clear from his statements in closing 
argument that he was trying to impeach the credibility of 
Appellant's main alibi witness.1 
x
. The prosecutor's claimed justification for engaging in 
this line of questioning is suspect for the simple reason that 
motive in a theft case is seldom a mystery. 
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[Defense Counsel] wants you to be cynical about 
Mr. Kaufer who is not a convicted felon, and yet 
he wants you to have all the trust for him, with 
Mr. Perry who is. That's ludicrous. And, yes, a 
felony conviction, particularly when it's Theft 
by Receiving, is something you can consider on an 
alibi witness. And it's the same Rick Perry 
alibi, convicted felon witness who apparently 
isn't too careful that's he's buying computer 
components from people who aren't even in the 
business of selling, a friend. I asked whether 
Paul, whoever it was, I asked is Paul in the 
wholesale/retail business? No, he's somebody who 
came in the store and I bought it. Well, are his 
parts hot, too? And that takes place, ladies and 
gentlemen. There's a whole black market 
situation going on. If you read the paper this 
weekend the Soviet Union, Russian General selling 
black market parts. It's a whole enterprise that 
goes on. That's why people steal and fence 
stolen property, to make money in their business, 
whatever. 
R. 424-25.2 
This is precisely the type of conduct forbidden in 
Emmett and Palmer. The prosecutor was allowed to run rampant and 
engage in a line of questioning that was highly prejudicial, but 
was never supported by the evidence. The prosecutor's misconduct 
during cross-examination was exacerbated by his remarks in 
closing argument where he argued, based on unsupported innuendo 
2
. Defense counsel did not object to this argument. However, 
in Palmer, the court held that the prosecutor's use of unsupported 
innuendo was plain error, even if not readily apparent to the trial 
court. 860 P.2d at 343-44. The prosecutor's use of unsupported 
innuendo in this case was far more extensive than in Palmer. Also, 
by closing arguments, the State had presented all its evidence. By 
then, it should have been apparent to the court that the State had 
presented no evidence to support its cross-examination and closing 
argument. Lastly, though counsel had objected repeatedly and been 
overruled on this issue, after all the evidence was submitted, 
counsel should have renewed the objection. Though counsel's 
performance in this respect was deficient, the clearer grounds for 
reversal lies in Palmer and the conclusion that it was plain error. 
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on cross-examination, that the jury should discredit Perry's 
testimony because he likely profited from Appellant's crime by 
purchasing stolen computer equipment from him. 
The prosecutor committed further misconduct by arguing 
Perry's felony conviction substantively in closing. Perry had 
admitted that approximately eight years ago, he had been 
convicted of Theft by Receiving. R. 604. It is well established 
that under Utah Rules of Evidence 4 04 and 609, past criminal 
convictions are only admissible for the limited purpose of 
attacking credibility. Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785. In Emmett, the 
prosecutor committed misconduct when he argued that because the 
defendant's prior forgery conviction involved a family member, he 
was the type of person who committed crimes against his family. 
Id. at 785-86.3 
In this case, the prosecutor also argued Perry's prior 
conviction for Theft by Receiving substantively by using the 
nature of the conviction as character evidence to support his 
allegation that Perry had received stolen property from 
Appellant, and was for that reason an untrustworthy alibi 
witness. In conjunction with the fact that this allegation was 
totally unsupported by the record, the prosecutor's conduct is 
3
. As indicated previously, counsel did not object to the 
prosecutor's comments in closing on the grounds that he was using 
Perry's conviction as character evidence. However, pursuant to 
Emmett, the prosecutor's conduct is plain error. 839 P.2d at 786 
(holding that prosecutor's use of defendant's prior conviction as 
character evidence in closing argument was plain error). Likewise, 
though clearly plain error pursuant to Emmett, counsel was also 
ineffective for failing to object to such an obvious misuse of 
Perry's prior conviction. 
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particularly outrageous. 
The prosecutor's misconduct constituted reversible error. 
His unfair and unsupported line of attack went to the heart of 
Appellant's alibi defense. In a case where the evidence is weak 
or conflicting, misconduct of this nature is far more likely to 
improperly influence the jury. Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786. In this 
case, the evidence against Appellant was limited solely to one 
questionable eyewitness identification. Also, the jury was 
presented with a compelling alibi defense and evidence that 
Appellant was not physically able to commit the crime. See 
Section III of this Brief for a complete recitation of the facts. 
For this reason, this case is similar to Emmett and Palmer and 
reversal is required. 
B. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY 
INFERRING THAT APPELLANT'S ALIBI WAS FABRICATED 
BECAUSE HIS WITNESSES DID NOT APPROACH THE POLICE 
PRIOR TO THE DEFENSE GIVING STATUTORY NOTICE OF 
ALIBI. 
The prosecutor on several occasions asked witnesses 
whether Appellant's alibi witnesses had come forward prior to 
receiving statutory notice of his alibi. The prosecutor asked 
Officer Tingey if anyone had come forward and indicated that 
Appellant had an alibi. R. 448. The prosecutor also cross-
examined Appellant's key alibi witness, Perry, as to whether he 
had contacted the police. R. 606. Though the trial court had 
earlier sustained defense counsel's objection to this line of 
questioning, he allowed the prosecutor to continue. R. 606. 
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Prosecutor: Did you at any time attempt to go to 
the police or advise the police of what was asked 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, we have already 
discussed this. He doesn't have a duty to go the 
police. 
Prosecutor: I agree. I'm not alleging that he 
does. 
The Court: You may answer. 
The Witness: What? 
Prosecutor: Did you ever advise any police 
agency, once you knew Mr. Haga had been arrested 
that in fact he might have an alibi? 
The Witness: No. 
R. 606-07. 
This line of questioning was misleading and improperly 
invited the jury to speculate that the witnesses did not come 
forward because the alibi was fabricated. This type of 
insinuation is improper because alibi witnesses have no duty to 
come forward to the police. Indeed, defense counsel would likely 
advise the witnesses to wait until after notice of alibi has been 
sent to talk with law enforcement, as it was in this case. 
People v. Kraai, 285 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) 
("Discrediting an alibi witness by insinuating her failure to act 
as a good citizen is not permissible."); People v. Costales, 87 
A.D.2d 635 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (It is improper for a prosecutor 
to attack the credibility of an alibi witness for failing to come 
forward when the witness has no civic duty to do so.) 
In People v. Hamlin, 58 A.D.2d 631, 680-81 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1977), the court reversed the defendant's conviction because 
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the prosecutor repeatedly argued that his alibi was fabricated 
because the witnesses had not come forward to the state prior to 
trial. The court noted: 
[N]o stigma should be attached to the testimony 
of a witness on a crucial issue solely because it 
is rendered for one side rather than the other. 
Cross-examination and summation may not be based 
upon fictitious assumptions which only confuse 
the fact-finders and impede the search for the 
truth. The clear purport of the prosecutor's 
endeavors in this instance was to implant in the 
jurors' minds the baseless proposition that the 
testimony of the two alibi witnesses was unworthy 
of belief simply because they had cooperated with 
defendant and his attorney and did not divulge 
whatever information they possessed to law 
enforcement authorities beforehand. Such false 
suggestion of impropriety has no place in our 
system of jurisprudence and should not be 
tolerated. 
Id. 
Likewise, in State v. Eberhart, 727 P.2d 1374, 1378 
(Okla. Ct. App. 1986), the court held that the failure of an 
alibi witness to voluntarily notify the police was too "highly 
ambiguous" to be used as impeachment evidence. 
In this case, the prosecutor's line of questioning is 
particularly misleading because in Utah the defense is required 
to give notice of its intent to rely on an alibi. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-14-2 (1995). The prosecutor received timely notice in 
this case. R. 32-33. Indeed, the prosecutor sent an 
investigator to interview Perry, who appeared to have been 
cooperative. R. 607. This is not a case where the State was 
faced with a surprise alibi defense. Yet, despite receiving 
adequate and timely notice, the prosecutor insinuated that there 
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was something suspicious about the failure of the witnesses to 
come forward earlier. 
The prosecutor's comments were prejudicial. As indicated 
in Section III of this brief, the evidence in this case was not 
strong, and conflicted with Appellant's alibi. The prosecutor's 
conduct was not aimed at a mere collateral issue, but went to the 
very heart of Appellant's defense. Recognizing that a 
defendant's alibi evidence is critical to the outcome of a close 
case, the courts in Hamlin and Costales reversed the convictions 
based upon the prosecutor's misconduct. Hamlin, 58 A.D.2d at 
681; Costales, 87 A.D.2d at 635. 
POINT II. DEFENSE COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE 
PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused effective 
assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 688, 694 (1984). In order to establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his 
lawyer's performance was deficient in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) "there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different" had counsel not performed deficiently. Hovater, 
914 P.2d at 39. 
A. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING 
TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER USE OF 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE. 
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The prosecutor elicited from the victim, Kaufer, on 
direct testimony that Kaufer had an "uncomfortable feeling" about 
Appellant when he hired him to do repair work. The prosecutor 
then implied that the "uncomfortable feeling" Kaufer had about 
Appellant was because he was a criminal. Utah Rules of Evidence 
4 04 and 608 prohibit the use of character evidence to prove the 
defendant acted in conformity therewith. State v. Tarafa, 72 0 
P.2d 1368, 1372 (Utah 1986). A prosecutor commits misconduct 
when he argues to the jury that the defendant has criminal 
inclinations, and is therefore likely guilty of the charged 
crime. Id. Defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's 
misconduct or seek a mistrial. Specifically, the prosecutor 
elicited the following testimony: 
Prosecutor: Any reason why you would have 
stopped using him? 
Witness: Just kind of an uncomfortable feeling. 
Prosecutor: Why is that? 
Witness: I have been in business 28 years and 
you just get feelings about people. 
Prosecutor: Did he say anything personally to 
give you that feeling? 
Witness: No, just an uncomfortable feeling. 
R. 549. 
Defense counsel did not object. Later, on redirect, the 
prosecutor again deliberately elicited from Kaufer the same 
testimony: 
Prosecutor: You and Mr. Griffin spent 
considerable time trying to ascertain how many 
clients you've had in your business over the past 
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few years, they were from 24 month to 5,000 plus. 
Of all of those potential clients that you've 
had, did you have any of the kind of feelings 
that you had about Mr. Haga when he came to do 
some work for you? 
Witness: No. Mr. Haga was the only one that I 
know of that I just felt uncomfortable with. 
R. 593. Again, defense counsel did not object. The prosecutor 
then proceeded to use this testimony to attack Appellant's 
character during closing argument. 
One thing I think is interesting, the defendant 
has been into the store multi times known as Dee 
Leasing. Mr. Kaufer got a funny feeling about 
Mr. Haga. And I would suggest to you that it was 
that funny feeling that Mr. Haga also picked up 
because that's the reason, I believe, that 
Mr. Haga defecated on the floor at Dee Leasing. 
This wasn't just a burglary and theft. This was 
also a statement of screw you, basically. 
R. 378. 
And the person who did it is Norman Andrew Haga, 
and that's the reason Mr. Kaufer didn't have a 
good feeling about Mr. Haga, because I think he 
suspected back when the work was being done by 
him that perhaps Mr. Haga was up to no good. And 
you draw some conclusions from that, from 
observations. 
When people are in the store they may be looking 
around. Who knows? Who knows what feelings or 
vibes Mr. Kaufer had, but they weren't good. 
Even though he was skilled in doing the computer 
work and technology for Mr. Kaufer he only let 
him do that one thing because of his feelings 
that he had. 
R. 378-79. Defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's 
comments. 
In this case, the prosecutor elicited evidence that was 
irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The prosecutor asked the jury 
to consider Kaufer's bad "feelings" as evidence of Appellant's 
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guilt. This line of argument drew the jury's attention to 
matters they were not justified in considering. Kaufer's bad 
"feelings" about Appellant were not relevant. The clear 
implication from the prosecutor's questions and argument was that 
Kaufer did not have a "good feeling" about Appellant because he 
somehow could "sense" that he was a bad person, and that indeed, 
his premonition about Appellant turned out to be true. The 
prosecutor even tried to legitimize and bolster Kaufer's alleged 
"sixth sense" by commenting that out of all the customers Kaufer 
has had, only Appellant gave him a bad feeling. This is the 
worst kind of character evidence because there is no way to rebut 
it, yet at the same time it casts suspicion on the defendant. 
Defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's conduct 
amounted to deficient performance. 
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING 
TO OBJECT WHEN THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY 
BOLSTERED THE CREDIBILITY OF THE STATE'S 
IDENTIFICATION WITNESS DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS. 
A prosecutor may not assert personal knowledge of the 
facts in an attempt to bolster a witness's credibility. State v. 
Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 904 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Prosecutors 
engage in misconduct when they "assert personal knowledge of the 
facts in issue or express personal opinion in the form of unsworn 
testimony that tends to 'exploit the influence of the 
prosecutor's office and undermine the objective detachment that 
should separate a lawyer from the cause being argued.'" State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 860 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Parsons, 
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781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989)). 
In this case, during closing argument, the prosecutor 
expressed his personal belief that the photo spread was very good 
in an attempt to bolster Olson's identification by commenting: 
What about identification? We have talked about 
the photo lineup that was done. I have never 
seen a photo lineup as good as that one in terms 
of finding look-a-likes to Mr. Haga. 
R. 372-73. Defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's 
comment. R. 373. The prosecutor's comment invited the jury to 
rely on his impression that the photo lineup was very good, thus 
improperly bolstering the credibility of the State's eyewitness. 
Since "the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of 
the Government," the jury was led to rely upon the prosecutor's 
judgment rather than their own assessment of the reliability of 
the identification. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 
1989) . 
This case is strikingly similar to Hopkins. In Hopkins, 
the court held that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
told the jury that he was "impressed by the evidence" in the 
case. Jd. at 479-80. The court found that this statement 
amounted to an expression of the prosecutor's personal view of 
the weight of the evidence. .Id. at 480. In this case, the 
prosecutor also expressed a personal opinion about the weight of 
the evidence by indicating that in his experience, he had never 
seen such a good photo spread. This comment had the effect of 
bolstering Olson's identification by making the photo spread seem 
more reliable because of the prosecutor's personal assurance as 
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to its quality. Like Hopkins, this comment was impermissible and 
defense counsel should have objected and moved for a mistrial. 
C. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING 
TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S DISPARAGEMENT OF 
THE DEFENSE. 
Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel by failing to object to the prosecutor's comment that the 
defense was engaging in a "ploy" and was using unfair tactics. 
It is improper for the State to make personal attacks on the 
ethics or integrity of defense counsel. United States v. Rios, 
611 F.2d 1335, 1342 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Friedman, 
909 F.2d 705, 709 (2nd Cir. 1990). Remarks which imply that the 
defense is engaging in unfair or unethical tactics are especially 
egregious because they mischaracterize and distort the jury's 
understanding of the roles of the attorneys and the adversarial 
process. Friedman, 909 F.2d at 709-10. 
In this case, during trial, the defense attempted to 
impeach the credibility of Kaufer by pointing out on cross-
examination that he did not have receipts or invoices to account 
for all of the merchandise he claimed was missing. R. 571-593. 
In response to this line of inquiry, the prosecutor stated during 
closing argument: 
A common ploy of defense attorneys is to try to 
discredit the victim. We have eye witness 
identification and vehicle identification. All 
the things that the State has you're not left 
with much then to try to discredit the victim. 
R. 419. The prosecutor went beyond the permissible bounds of 
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conduct by referring to defense counsel's legitimate efforts to 
focus the jury's attention on the lack of evidence supporting 
Kaufer's claimed loss of property as a "ploy." Webster's New 
World Dictionary defines ploy as "An action or a maneuver 
intended to outwit or disconcert another person." Disconcert 
means to "upset or frustrate the composure or self-possession" of 
another, "embarrass" or "confuse." The word "ploy" implies then 
a tactic which is both manipulative and underhanded. 
The prosecutor's reference to the defense's efforts to 
point out the lack of evidence supporting Kaufer's claimed 
property losses was improper for several reasons. His comment 
mischaracterized the role of defense counsel by painting 
counsel's efforts to represent his client as an attempt to use 
unfair tactics to get an acquittal. The prosecutor's comment 
urged the jury to "ignore defense counsel's entirely legitimate 
role as an advocate." Friedman, 909 F.2d at 709. The 
prosecutor's remark maligned defense counsel personally by 
implying that he was willing to resort to unfair tactics to try 
to trick the jury. The prosecutor's comment also characterized 
legitimate cross-examination as an attempt to harass and 
embarrass the victim. Lastly, the prosecutor's comment left the 
jury with a distorted view of the adversary process by equating a 
defense with a ploy. 
In this respect, this case is similar to Friedman. In 
Friedman, the prosecutor also characterized the defense 
attorney's role as an attempt to "get" the guilty "off," while 
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the government sought justice. Ld. at 708. Because this comment 
mischaracterized the defense's role and the adversarial process, 
the court held that the prosecutor's conduct amounted to 
reversible error. Id. 709-710. See also Rios, 611 F.2d at 1341-
42 (prosecutor's comments that the defense's investigator had 
contrived the defense held reversible error). Defense counsel 
could not afford to allow the prosecutor's comments to go 
unchallenged. His failure to object and move for a mistrial 
amounted to deficient performance. 
Appellant was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to 
object to the prosecutor's improper use of character evidence 
against him, his comment on the weight of the photo 
identification evidence, and his comments disparaging the 
defense. It cannot be emphasized enough that the outcome of this 
case hinged on the jury's evaluation of the strength of the 
eyewitness identification against Appellant's alibi evidence. 
Any misconduct by the prosecutor which undermined the defense was 
for this reason particularly damaging. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. 
See Section III of this brief for a complete summary of the facts 
of the case. 
POINT III. APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE 
PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED AND PERVASIVE MISCONDUCT. 
The cumulative effect of the prosecutor's misconduct 
requires reversal. In determining whether errors are harmful, 
the court will more closely scrutinize the prosecutor's 
misconduct where the evidence is less than compelling. 
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If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their 
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence 
susceptible of differing interpretations, there 
is a greater likelihood that they will be 
improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. 
Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be 
searching for guidance in weighing and 
interpreting the evidence. They may be 
especially susceptible to influence, and a small 
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect 
the verdict. 
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. See also Tarafa, 720 P.2d at 1372-73; 
Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786. Even if there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction, if the evidence is not compelling, the 
prosecutor's misconduct is far more likely to have influenced the 
jury. Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786.4 
The jurors in this case were asked to weigh the strength 
of the eyewitness identification against Appellant's alibi 
evidence. There was no other evidence linking Appellant to the 
burglary. Though fingerprints were found on one of the burglary 
tools, they did not match those of Appellant. R. 451-52. None 
of the stolen property was recovered or linked to Appellant. 
Olson's testimony regarding the description of the vehicle was 
inconsistent. Olson testified at trial that the lettering on the 
side of the truck said "Custom Installations." R. 466. Olson 
told Detective Hansen the day of the burglary that the truck had 
blue, orange and black lettering on the side that had something 
to do with insulation. R. 343. Detective Hansen admitted that 
4
. The prejudice analysis outlined in this section applies 
with equal force to Appellant's claim that counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to the prosecutor's use of character 
evidence, his disparagement of the defense, and his comment on the 
weight of the evidence argued in Section II of this brief. 
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the description of the emblem on the side of the truck given to 
him by Olson matched vehicles from a neighboring business called 
Commercial Insulators. R. 344. The logo on Appellant's truck 
was "Intermountain Installers" written in orange/red letters on a 
blue triangle. There was no black lettering on the vehicle. 
R. 453, 525; State's exhibit 10-S. Olson did not observe a 
license plate number. R. 467. 
Olson's identification of Appellant was not solid. Olson 
seemed unsure as to how long he observed the man standing by the 
truck. R. 488. He testified it could have been 10 seconds, but 
also claimed he observed the man for as long as one to two 
minutes. R. 492-493. Olson could only remember seeing the man 
once as he pulled into his place of business. R. 468-472. He 
could not remember seeing the man load any boxes. R. 471, 474. 
Olson could not describe the color or type of shirt the man wore, 
the color of his pants, whether he was wearing a jacket or coat, 
or the type of shoes he wore. R. 498-99. Olson never saw the 
individual loading the truck enter the building. He did not 
identify the box being loaded into the truck as computer parts 
from Dee Leasing. R. 470-71. 
Appellant presented compelling evidence that he was not 
only somewhere else when the crime occurred, but that he was 
physically incapable of committing the crime. The physician who 
had treated his foot the night before the burglary testified that 
his foot was swollen and inflamed and that his injury prevented 
him from engaging in any strenuous physical activity. R. 637-39. 
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Yet, the State maintained that despite this injury, Appellant 
somehow was able to climb a wooden pallet over a six foot fence, 
climb a tire rack onto the roof of the building to cut the phone 
wires, and load $14,000 worth of computer equipment into a pick-
up truck. Two witnesses testified that at the time of the 
burglary, Appellant was at A & P Tire Company on 6217 West and 
4100 South. R. 596-97, 616. 
Because of the conflicting evidence, this is precisely 
the type of case where a prosecutor's misconduct is especially 
damaging. The prosecutor's repeated misconduct was particularly 
prejudicial in this case because he unfairly undermined 
Appellant's alibi defense, and at the same time improperly 
bolstered the State's eyewitness evidence. The prosecutor 
engaged in a speculative and factually unsupported line of cross-
examination with Appellant's key alibi witness, and then 
improperly argued without a shred of evidence that he should not 
be believed because he was Appellant's fence. R. 424-25, 607-10. 
He added to the prejudice by arguing the witness's prior 
conviction substantively as character evidence to bolster his 
otherwise unsupported claim that he purchased stolen property 
from Appellant. R. 424-25. The prosecutor further unfairly 
undermined Appellant's alibi by implying that the alibi witnesses 
were not credible because they had not spoken with law 
enforcement prior to the time required by statute. R. 448, 606-
07. He also suggested to the jury that they consider the 
victim's bad "feeling" he had about Appellant as evidence of his 
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guilt. R. 378-79, 549, 593. The prosecutor then invited the 
jury to rely upon his own expertise in evaluating the strength of 
the photo identification. R. 372-73. Last, but not least, the 
prosecutor undermined the entire defense by insinuating that 
defense counsel was engaging in unfair tactics aimed at confusing 
the jury and embarrassing the victim. R. 419. 
Appellant was further prejudiced by defense counsel's 
failure to object to the majority of the prosecutor's misconduct 
and demand a mistrial. Defense counsel allowed the prosecutor to 
run rampant and the trial court likewise did nothing to stop 
him.5 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE RESTITUTION TO BE PAID TO THE 
VICTIM'S INSURANCE COMPANY. 
At sentencing, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay 
Travelers Insurance Company $13,13 0 in restitution. R. 315. See 
5
. The prosecutor's use of character evidence in the form of 
Kaufer's testimony that he had a bad feeling about Appellant, his 
personal attack on defense counsel, his substantive use of Perry's 
prior conviction, and his statements regarding the photo spread all 
constituted plain error. Palmer, 860 P. 2d at 343. The court will 
find plain error if (1) an error exists; (2) it should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (3) it was harmful. Id. at 342. 
In Palmer the court held that the prosecutor's use of unsupported 
innuendo was plain error, despite the fact that the error was not 
readily apparent to the court. Id. at 343. The court also found 
that the prosecutor's examination of one witness as to the veracity 
of another witness and his argument in closing on matters not in 
evidence were plain error. Id. at 343-45. Likewise, in this case, 
the blatant and egregious nature of the prosecutor's repeated 
misconduct should be held plain error. Even if his comments were 
not "obvious," because of their harmful effect, that requirement 
should be dispensed "so that justice can be done." Id. at 344. 
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Appellant's Presentence Report. Current code provisions do not 
permit restitution awards to insurance companies that merely pay 
an insured's covered expenses. Although an insurance company's 
payments to an insured were previously within the permissible 
scope of restitution awards, recent amendments to the code 
exclude such expenses. Prior to 1995, insurance companies that 
had reimbursed the victims of criminal conduct were also held to 
be "victims" for purposes of restitution. State v. Staver, 706 
P.2d 611, 613 (Utah 1985), citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (d) 
(1983) (defining "victim" as a person who the court determines 
has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of a defendant's 
criminal actions), and Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1983) 
(stating that a "person" may be a corporation). 
In 1995 and 1996, however, the code was amended and 
established new limits on the scope of restitution orders. Under 
the current code, an insurance company that reimburses the 
pecuniary expenses of a victim of criminal conduct is no longer 
itself a "victim" for purposes of restitution orders. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (Supp. 1996) provides: 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity 
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
this subsection, or for conduct for which the 
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part 
of a plea agreement. For purposes of 
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined 
in Section 77-38-2, and family member has the 
meaning as defined in Section 77-37-2. 
(emphasis added). Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (9) (a) (Supp. 1996) 
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provides: 
"Victim of a crime" means any person against whom 
the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have 
been perpetrated or attempted by the defendant or 
minor personally or as a party to the offense or 
conduct or, in the discretion of the court, 
against whom a related crime or act is alleged to 
have been perpetrated or attempted, unless the 
natural person is the accused or appears to be 
accountable or otherwise criminally responsible 
for or criminally involved in the crime or 
conduct or a crime or act arising from the same 
conduct, criminal episode, or plan as the crime 
is defined under the laws of this state. 
(emphasis added). 
It is a longstanding rule that a statute should be 
construed according to its plain language. A.B. v. State of 
Utah, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). When 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the court should not 
look beyond it to surmise the legislature's intent. Id. "When 
language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what 
it expressed, and no room is left for construction." Id. 
(quoting Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, 
890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995)). "Unless statutory language is 
"unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contradiction 
to the express purpose of the statute,' this court applies the 
statute's literal wording." State v. Parker, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 
58, 58 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Allred v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd., 914 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). 
The 1995 amendment reflects two substantive changes. 
First and foremost, the change limited restitution to the actual 
or direct victim of criminal conduct; that is, any "person 
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against whom the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have been 
perpetrated." Consequently, persons against whom the defendant 
is not alleged to have committed the crime are not included as 
"victims" under the amended code. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) clearly and in plain terms directs the court to the 
definition of "victim" found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 when 
determining who is entitled to restitution. The definition of 
"victim" found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (e) (i) does not 
apply to restitution orders. Therefore, the issue is whether the 
insurance company is a "person against whom the charged crime or 
conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated."6 
In combination, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) and 
77-38-2(9)(a) limit the court's ability to order restitution. 
The current code provides for restitution to the direct or actual 
victim of criminal conduct. Thus, except in circumstances where 
the insurance company is the direct victim of criminal conduct, 
the insurance company may not obtain a restitution order.7 In 
this case, the charged crime or conduct of burglary and theft was 
not alleged to have been perpetrated against Traveler's 
6
. Originally, the 1995 version of Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-
(9) (a) defined a "victim" as a "natural person." In 1996, the 
legislature amended this provision to apply to a "person," thus 
including corporations where the corporation was the actual or 
direct victim of the criminal conduct, as in an insurance fraud 
case. Significantly, though given the opportunity, the legislature 
did not broaden restitution to those who are not the direct victims 
of the charged crime. 
7
 An insurance company, of course, could still seek 
reimbursement by instigating a separate, civil action against the 
person that caused the insured's damages. 
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Insurance Co. The person against whom the charged crime was 
perpetrated was Dee Leasing. Accordingly, Traveler's Insurance 
Co. is not a "victim" entitled to restitution under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i). 
POINT V. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR 
FAILING TO MOVE FOR A CONTINUANCE IN RESPONSE TO 
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE TIMELY DISCOVERY. 
Defense counsel made a request for discovery of "all 
documentation promised at the preliminary hearing relating to all 
items allegedly stolen by the Defendant including but not limited 
to: bills of shipping, bills of receipt, serial numbers, order 
and receipt of order information, cancelled checks, insurance 
claims, paid in full receipts, received on account notices, etc." 
R. 28-29. At trial, defense counsel noted that Kaufer did not 
provide receipts or invoices to document all of the merchandise 
he alleged had been stolen. R. 573. Counsel argued mid-trial 
that the State had failed to comply with a voluntary agreement to 
provide discovery of the receipts. R. 573-74. Counsel indicated 
that while he did receive some receipts, the State did not 
provide them until the eve of trial. R. 576. Counsel argued 
that he was prejudiced by the incomplete and delinquent response 
to discovery because he was not able to adequately cross-examine 
Kaufer about the existence of the claimed property. R. 577. 
Despite this complaint, counsel failed to request a continuance. 
When the State chooses to respond voluntarily to a 
discovery request under Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal 
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Procedure, "considerations of fairness require that the 
prosecution respond to the request in a manner that will not be 
misleading." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987). 
Should the government fail to do so, Rule 16 gives the trial 
court the power to obviate any prejudice resulting from the 
breach of discovery rules. Id. at 918. Failure of the 
prosecutor to fully respond to a Rule 16 request can impair the 
adversary process. State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Utah 
1989). While a failure to make a motion for discovery does not 
per se constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel does 
have a duty to adequately prepare and investigate the case. 
State v. Viail, 840 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990); State v. Crestani, 771 
P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). If counsel is not prepared 
because of the State's violation of discovery rules, he has a 
duty to seek an adequate remedy. 
In this case, counsel failed to seek a remedy despite his 
admitted lack of preparation. The receipts were material to 
Kaufer's credibility as to his testimony that merchandise had 
been stolen from his place of business. Since Olson was not able 
to identify any of the boxes he saw being loaded into the pick up 
truck, and no stolen property was ever recovered, Kaufer was the 
only witness who could establish that a theft occurred. For this 
reason, Appellant was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to 
seek an immediate remedy for the State's failure to comply with 
its promise to provide the receipts. See Crestani, 771 P.2d at 
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1091-92 (trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain 
pertinent bank records involved in the case). 
POINT VI. COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO PRESENT 
EVIDENCE THAT THE STATE'S ONLY EYEWITNESS HAD 
BEEN SHOWN A PHOTOGRAPH OF APPELLANT PRIOR TO THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
Case law consistently recognizes that counsel has a duty 
to prepare to defend a criminal defendant. Templin, 805 P.2d at 
188; Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1090. When counsel knows of the 
existence of information relevant to his client's defense, it is 
his duty to investigate and subsequently present evidence 
material to the case. Jennings v. State, 744 P.2d 212, 214 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1987). 
In this case, defense counsel failed to present evidence 
that prior to the preliminary hearing, but after Olson had seen 
the photo spread, the State sent Olson a picture of Appellant. 
R. 296-98.8 Several cases recognize the due process violations 
that may be involved in eyewitness identification cases, and 
discuss the need to apprise jurors of the factors to be 
considered in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony. 
See State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432 (Utah 1989); State v. Long, 721 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) . Clearly, the fact that the eyewitness has 
been shown a photograph of the defendant prior to trial is a 
8
. The State claimed it sent Olson a picture of Appellant 
because someone had rigged a pipe bomb to Olson's door and 
Appellant was a suspect. The photo was sent so Olson could "post" 
it and "see what the individual looked like." R. 297. Appellant 
was never charged with this offense. 
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significant factor calling into question the reliability of the 
subsequent in court identification. 
Given the importance of the identification in this case 
and the conflicting evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury may have acquitted had they known of the tainted 
identification. In this case particularly, the only evidence 
linking Appellant to the crime was this sole identification. 
Counsel should have presented evidence that Olson's in court 
identification was likely tainted by the photograph. Olson's 
in court identification was arguably a result of his having had a 
photograph of Appellant to "post" in his place of business for 
several months, rather than a result of anything he witnessed on 
the day of the burglary. Having called into question the 
reliability of the in court identification, the jury would have 
been left with the photo spread identification as the only 
evidence against Appellant. With the knowledge from the Long 
instruction that photo identifications are less reliable, the 
jury may well have concluded that the State had not met its 
burden of proof. R. 86. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests 
this Court reverse his conviction and remand the case to the 
district court with orders for a new trial. 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing — 
Definitions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Section 77-38-2 and family member has the meaning as 
defined in Section 77-37-2. 
77-14-2. Alibi — Notice requirements — Witness lists. 
(1) A defendant, whether or not written demand has been made, who 
intends to offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less than ten days before trial or 
at such other time as the court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting 
attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim alibi. The notice shall 
contain specific information as to the place where the defendant claims to have 
been at the time of the alleged offense and, as particularly as is known to the 
defendant or his attorney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom 
he proposes to establish alibi. The prosecuting attorney, not more than five 
days after receipt of the list provided herein or at such other time as the court 
may direct, shall file and serve the defendant with the addresses, as particu-
larly as are known to him, of the witnesses the state proposes to offer to 
contradict or impeach the defendant's alibi evidence. 
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be under a continuing 
duty to disclose the names and addresses of additional witnesses which come 
to the attention of either party after filing their alibi witness lists. 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to comply with the require-
ments of this section, the court may exclude evidence offered to estabUsh or 
rebut alibi. However, the defendant may always testify on his own behalf 
concerning alibi. 
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive the requirements of this 
section. 
77-38-2. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this chapter and the Utah Constitution: 
(1) "Abuse" means treating the crime victim in a manner so as to injure, 
damage, or disparage. 
(2) "Dignity* means treating the crime victim with worthiness, honor, 
and esteem. 
(3) Tailless" means treating the crime victim reasonably, even-
handedly, and impartially. 
(4) "Harassment" means treating the crime victim in a persistently 
annoying manner. 
(5) "Important criminal justice hearings" or "important juvenile justice 
hearings" means the following proceedings in felony criminal cases or 
cases involving a minor's conduct which would be a felony if committed by 
an adult: 
(a) any preliminary hearing to determine probable cause; 
(b) any court arraignment where practical; 
(c) any court proceeding involving the disposition of charges 
against a defendant or minor or the delay of a previously scheduled 
trial date but not including any unanticipated proceeding to take an 
admission or a plea of guilty as charged to all charges previously filed 
or any plea taken at an initial appearance; 
(d) any court proceeding to determine whether to release a defen-
dant or minor and, if so, under what conditions release may occur, 
excluding any such release determination made at an initial appear-
ance; 
(e) any criminal or delinquency trial, excluding any actions at the 
trial that a court might take in camera, in chambers, or at a sidebar 
conference; 
(f) any court proceeding to determine the disposition of a minor or 
sentence, fine, or restitution of a defendant or to modify any disposi-
tion of a minor or sentence, fine, or restitution of a defendant; and 
(g) any public hearing concerning whether to grant a defendant or 
minor parole or other form of discretionary release from confinement. 
(6) "Reliable information" means information worthy of confidence, 
including any information whose use at sentencing is permitted by the 
United States Constitution. 
(7) "Representative of a victim" means a person who is designated by 
the victim or designated by the court and who represents the victim in the 
best interests of the victim. 
(8) "Respect" means treating the crime victim with regard and value. 
(9) (a) Victim of a crime" means any person against whom the charged 
crime or conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted by 
the defendant or minor personally or as a party to the offense or 
conduct or, in the discretion of the court, against whom a related crime 
or act is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted, unless the 
natural person is the accused or appears to be accountable or 
otherwise criminally responsible for or criminally involved in the 
crime or conduct or a crime or act arising from the same conduct, 
criminal episode, or plan as the crime is defined under the laws of this 
state. 
(b) For purposes of the right to be present, "victim of a crime" does 
not mean any person who is in custody as a pretrial detainee, as a 
prisoner following conviction for an offense, or as a juvenile who has 
committed an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult, 
or who is in custody for mental or psychological treatment. 
(c) For purposes of the right to be present and heard at a public 
hearing as provided in Subsection 77-38-2(5)(g) and the right to notice 
as provided in Subsection 77-38-3(7)(a), "victim of a crime" includes 
any victim originally named in the allegation of criminal conduct who 
is not a victim of the offense to which the defendant entered a 
negotiated plea of guilty. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 404, Character evidence not admissible to prove con-
duct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in confor-
mity therewith on a particular' occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that 
the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a 
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or 
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful char-
acter is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has 
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, 
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if proba-
tive of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination 
of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or un-
truthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-exam-
ined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, 
does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against 
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only 
to credibility. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that' a witness other than the accused has been convicted 
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 4U3, if the crime was punish-
able by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under 
which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been 
convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been Convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if 
a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or 
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of 
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts 
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, 
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not 
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance 
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with 
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evi-
dence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has 
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other 
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person 
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the 
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent 
procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is gener-
ally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal 
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the 
accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibil-
ity of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is neces-
sary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not 
render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an 
appeal is admissible. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district sjhaW have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XTV 
- ^ Section 
protection.] ., .. 
2. [Representatives - Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5- Power to enforce amendment] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurlfdiS^ereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State^hereon 
thVy reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abndge the 
S S T a r immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
E v e any person of life, liberty, or property without due F » ^ £ * » * 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State S S n g Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
K e c ? o k e of electors for President and Vice-President of the United Stetes 
Spresentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State or 
^members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male^oh** 
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of^theparted 
States or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or otber 
c ^ Se^asis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or mihtary, under die 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
S e r of Congress, or as an officer of the United States « » « « £ £ £ 
flnv State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, w 
Sport S e Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged m msurrec-
S n o V rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
S e l f . But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Pudblic debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
rlflim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
. and "ifli™* shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress *h*^ have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
Art. I CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived oflifey liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
